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Abstract 
A resilient and secure control system should be designed to be as safe and robust as possible in face of different types of attacks 
such as fault data injection (FDI) attacks; thus, nowadays, the control designers should also consider the probable attacks in their 
control design from the beginning. For this reason, detection of intentional faults and cyber-attacks attracts a great concern 
among researchers. This issue plays a great role in the safety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) due to the need of continuous 
supervision and control of these systems. In order to have a cyber-attack tolerant (CAT) controller, the attack and the type of 
attack should be detected in the first step. This paper introduces a new algorithm to detect fault data injection attack in UAV. An 
adaptive neural network is used to detect the injected faults in sensors of an UAV. An embedded Kalman filter (EKF) is used for 
online tuning of neural networks weights; these online tuning makes the attack detection faster and more accurate. The simulation 
results show that the proposed method can successfully detect FDI attacks applied to an UAV. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of scientific committee of Missouri University of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) increased significantly [1]. This growth will be 
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continued by technology improvement which will lead to cheaper and more intelligent UAV’s systems. This wide 
spread application of UAV increases the safety and security concerns. Conventional autopilot designs are based on 
the human supervision and do not consider the cyber security threats, which makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
In 2009, a predator UAV stream hijacked which increased the attention to the UAV cyber-security considerably [1]. 
Generally, cyber-attacks can be divided in to three main categories: hardware attacks, wireless attacks, and sensor 
spoofing [1]. In hardware attacks the attacker has access to the autopilot hardware components; while, in wireless 
attacks, the attackers use wireless communication channels to penetrate the system. Several researches investigated 
strategies to prevent wireless communication attacks [2-4]. In these works, they introduce algorithms to detect 
attacks that want to penetrate and extract the cypher keys. By extracting the cypher keys, attackers can enter their 
false data within the same structure of correct data. In these kinds of attacks, attackers introduce errors in 
cryptographic algorithm in order to obtain the faulty cipher text so that they can decode the cipher key.  
Sensor spoofing which is the main subject of this paper can be defined as passing false sensor information to the 
UAV’s on-board autopilot. In these kinds of attacks, it is considered that the attacker has already entered in the 
system, so in order to have a secure system, it should be tried to detect and isolate the injected faults from the real 
data. Attackers can perform sensor spoofing with various kinds of procedures such as injecting faults to the sensor 
feedback link, malfunctioning sensors, or overloading the on-board processor which can be led to denial of service 
between the sensor and the controller. These kinds of attacks can be detected by the fault detection algorithms.  
Various researches have been done to obtain robust controllers that can tolerate small fault and uncertainties [5-8]; 
however, in order to have a robust controller their designs had to be very conservative that limit the maneuverability 
of the control system. Therefore, the detection algorithms attract researcher’s attention [9-16].  Several algorithms 
have been proposed for FDI attacks but only a few of them focused on detection of the FDI attacks on UAV [9-11]. 
Among these methods, neural network (NN) received most of attention due to its ability in online learning and 
estimation of the nonlinear systems [12-16]. A fault detection design which is based on a bank of observer with 
learning ability using diagnostic residuals for discrete-time nonlinear systems is introduced by Wu et al. [12]. In 
their design in order to update the observer parameters, for each sample a type of Proportional-Derivative learning 
algorithm was used. 
An NN based system modeling for fault detection process is introduced by Samy et al. [13]. In this design, the 
system identification was obtained through off-line learning process, so, the fault detection process does not need 
the model data during the operation. However, due to the fact that the model identification was performed off-line, 
the model cannot provide needed information for highly nonlinear system with uncertainties. A fault detection 
design based on NN is introduced for actuator faults in satellite by Talebi et al. [14]. However, this design was based 
on the assumption that all the detailed behavior of the system is available. 
Chen et al. introduced a neural fault tolerant control design which was designed for faults in the actuators of a three 
degree of freedom helicopter [15]. In their design neural observer was designed based on radial basis function. 
However, this design cannot detect the faults in the helicopter sensors. Shen et al. presented a neural network fault 
detection technique that it considers the time delay between the fault detection and fault accommodation [16]. 
However, this technique assumes that fault occurrence time is larger than the system stabilization time (ts<tf) which 
make this design vulnerable to sudden faults. 
This paper introduces a novel detection system for FDI in sensors of the UAV. This design is based on a three layer 
adaptive NN in which it’s learning coefficients are updated by EKF that can be applied to the UAV systems to 
detect and isolate the cyber-attacks in sensors. Conventional NN detection techniques suffer from the slow learning 
rate that makes the system vulnerable to abrupt faults and attacks. Using EKF for updating the learning coefficients 
helps to improve the detection ability of neural network, increase the learning rate, and gives the ability to detect 
sudden FDI. The proposed algorithm has been implemented and evaluated on a six-degree-of-freedom (DoF) 
aircraft model, i.e., a nonlinear model of WVU YF-22 unmanned aircraft. The simulation results via MATLAB 
SIMULINK software show that the proposed method can detect FDI attack and the sensor faults successfully.  
   The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides the problem definition and explanation, while the proposed 
detection strategy is illustrated in Section 3. Then in Section 4, simulation results are presented to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the introduced method. Finally, the conclusions and future work are provided in Section 5. 
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2. Problem Statement 
The significant growth in wireless communication system brought convenience in aircraft design and management, 
but at the same time brought the security concerns for designers [17-22]. These wireless communications can be 
used as a potential gate for cyber attackers to enter and take the control of the system or interrupt it.  Due to the 
nature of UAV’s systems, they use more wireless communication system which makes them better target for 
attackers. Moreover, lack of human supervision makes them more vulnerable to the cyber-attacks. In recent years, 
the security and stability of UAVs have been at the centre stage for researchers, engineers, and governmental 
entities, since exploited security risks could have potential catastrophic consequences [1]. Although the security and 
stability schemes for UAVs have advanced in the past several years, there have been several acknowledged cyber-
attacks and confirmations that these systems are not very safe and stable in the face of attacks and natural 
disturbances. 
This paper deals with FDI attacks in the aircraft sensor systems. This class of attack injects faults into a device 
performing some type of computation. These faults can be anything from unusual environmental conditions 
(increased heat, for example), the injection of a laser beam at the appropriate frequency [23], or the injection of data 
packets that collide with legitimate packets [24].   
An illustration of an FDI attack on a UAV is shown in Fig.1. This figure shows the gates that attacker can use for 
penetration in the system; like inertial measurement units (IMU), GPS satellites, and communication protocols (CP). 
In this paper we focused on the IMU sensors. IMU is an integrated circuit contains accelerometers and gyroscope 
which gives the information related to linear and angular motion of the aircraft. This information is used as a 
feedback for the control system to modify the aircraft attitude based on the desired manoeuvre.  
 
Fig. 1. Potential sub-systems that cyber attackers can penetrate in the UAV system 
3. Fault Data Injection Detection Design 
Faults can be injected in the sensors described by the following nonlinear system 
 
(1) 
where u(t)Rm is the input vector, y(t)Rr is the output vector, x(t)Rn is the state vector, f : Rn o Rn is the state 
function, g: Rn o Rnum is the input function, DRn is sensor uncertainties and disturbances, h: Rn o Rr is the output 
function, and  fs(x,u) is the injected fault data in sensors, whose elements describe the faults in the system. 
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where z is an input signal intended by the attacker for the purpose of either misleading the control system, causing 
systems inefficiencies, or sabotaging it.  
3.1. Neural network adaptive structure design 
The proposed neural network adaptive structure (NNAS) which is used for FDI attack detection is developed in this 
subsection. Injected faults do not have any specific pattern and can be very complicated in their structure; hence, NN
can be a suitable candidate for estimating them. Unlike the direct NN modelling procedures, NNAS estimates faults 
based on the nonlinear observer output and sensor output by using  
 
(3) 
where ˆ( )x t  is the state vector of the  nonlinear observer and M(t) is the neural network observer at time t, that can be 
defined as follow  [12]: 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))i i i iM t W t V t I tV  (4) 
where, Mi(t) is the i-th vector of observer input M(t) for i = 1, …, n. Wi(t) and Vi(t) = [Vi,1(t), …,  Vi,m+n(t)] are the i-
th NNAS input parameters at time t. V(x) is the sigmoid activation function, and it is called 'tansig' or 'logsig' in 
neural networks. Here, the activation function considered is ( ) (1 ) / (1 )x xx e eV     , and Ii(t) can be defined 
by ( ) [ ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( )]Ti i i i iI t M t M t m e t e t nW W W W     . where Ĳ indicate the sampling period or the step size, and ei(t) 
is the i-th estimated fault variable of the output ˆ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))ie t h x t h x t  . Here, m and n are chosen based on the 
needed speed response in the system. Large values of m and n guaranty the convergence of the training; however, 
they may increase the computation time and add unnecessary delays [25]. The input of observer M(t) is recursively 
updated with the previous m samples  of the observer inputs ( )M k iW for i = 1,2,…,m, and also previous n samples 
of the system output error ( )ie t iW  for i =1,2,…,n. 
3.2. Neural network weight update law 
In order to have fast fault detection, neural network weights should be tuned [26]. Here an adaptive parameter tuning 
algorithm based on Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is introduced. The EKF helps to update the NN weighting 
parameters online, so, fast convergence rate of the NN learning will be guaranteed.  Through the updating process, if 
we consider the i-th element of NAS, then the EKF updating parameter can be described by [25]:   
 (5) 
where k is the k-th sampling instant, and the relation between variable k and time variable t  is /k t W « »¬ ¼ . The 
parameters will be calculated in each sampling time with the following rules [12] 
  




where Ki  is the learning coefficient, Pi(k) is the covariance matrix of the state estimation error, Ki(k) is the Kalman 
gain, and Ri(k) is the covariance matrix of the estimated noise, which is computed recursively by [27]: 
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2( ) ( 1) [ ( ) ( 1)] /i i i iR k R k e k R k k      (7) 
Here Hi(k) is the derivative of ( )ie k with respect to Ti.. Based on the observer input in equation (4), Hi(k) can be 
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In this paper, we consider that attacker injects faults to angular rate sensors, i.e., p, q and r. Typical motion 
equations of the airplane angular rate with faults can described as 
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where D(x,u) is the system uncertainties, NS is the sensor noise; fs(t) is the fault function which  occurs in the 
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Based on the above description, an NNAS is designed by 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] ( )T i
x f x g x u












( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))i i i j i i i
j
M t W t V t M t j V t y tV W W
 
   ¦   (13) 
 
The overall structure of the proposed NNAS method is depicted in Fig.2. 
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Fig. 2. Overall diagram of proposed NNAS design for FDI detection.  
4. Numerical Simulation 
In this section two different FDI attacks are simulated to examine the performance of the proposed NNAS technique 
in detection of the FDI attack in UAV’s sensors. The proposed fault detection algorithm has been implemented and 
evaluated on a six-degree-of-freedom (DoF) aircraft model, i.e., a nonlinear model of WVU YF-22 unmanned 
aircraft [29]. Two scenarios have been considered in the simulated attacks. In the first scenario a step shape attack is 
inserted in the IMU sensors. In the second scenario, a Gaussian shape attack is inserted to the IMU sensors. In both 
scenarios a random signal with the amplitude of 0.08 radian is also added as a noise to the considered attacks. 
Simulations are done separately for the attacks in p, q, and r which are the rolling, pitching, and the yawing rate of 
the aircraft, respectively. The results of the simulations are presented in Fig.3 and Fig.4.  Fig.3 shows that the 
proposed NNAS design can successfully detect the FDI attack with sudden changes. The step FDI attack has a sharp 
edge which is difficult to be detected by conventional algorithms, while, as it can be seen the proposed NNAS 
design detected it fast. Fig. 4 shows the proposed design is able to detect smooth attacks in the sensors as well. The 
chattering in Fig.3 and Fig.4 is related to the considered noise and the attack scenarios. In Fig.3 and Fig.4 solid line 
is the FDI attack and dashed line is the estimated attack using proposed detection technique.  
 
 
Fig.3. FDI attack detection using proposed technique in presence of a step shaped attack 
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Fig.4. FDI attack detection using proposed technique in presence of a Gaussian shaped attack 
5. Conclusion and future works 
In this work the possible cyber-attacks to the aircraft attitude sensors have been investigated. A new approach based 
on neural network observer is introduced which is capable of online detection of possible attacks on the UAV 
sensors in the IMU. The proposed design uses EKF to tune the NN weights which increases the learning speed of 
the NN, and subsequently, improves the ability of the detection of the sudden attacks. The simulation results show 
that the developed method can successfully and accurately detect the sudden and smooth attacks in the sensors. This 
detection can be further used to help the system to correct itself and to be robust against cyber-attacks. 
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